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The main goal of this chapter is to present Portugal and Spain 
as relevant benchmarks for the analysis of the relationship 
between media and politics in the CEE new democracies. 
Throughout the chapter, a comparative framework of the 
European Union member states in 2009 is used in order to 
offer the reader a detailed, contextualized, and updated 
analysis of the main features that characterize the Portuguese 
and Spanish media systems, as well as the implications for the 
role of the media in the political process. In addition to 
discussing the cases of Spain and Portugal, this chapter also 
offers some ideas on how specific CEE countries may resemble 
the media systems of the Iberian nations.
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The number of comparative studies in the field of political 
communication increased considerably after Daniel Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini’s publication of Comparing Media Systems.1 In 
this book, four dimensions are used to distinguish between the 
media environments in Western countries around the year 
2000: press market development, parallelism between parties 
and media outlets, state intervention in the realm of media, 
and levels of journalist professionalization. The authors 
conclude that in Western Europe and North America three 
types of media systems2 coexisted: a polarized pluralist model 
(in Southern Europe), a democratic corporatist model (in 
Scandinavia and some Western European countries), and a 
liberal model (Canada, USA, Ireland, and the UK). Within this 
framework, both Portugal and Spain are described as 
polarized pluralist media systems, given their weak press 
markets and low patterns of journalistic professionalization, as 
well as strong state intervention in the realm of media and 
parallelism between media outlets and political parties.
One of the most interesting trends in comparative political 
communication research in the last decade has been the work 
on the development of Central and Eastern European (CEE)3
media systems after the end of the communist regimes. 
Initially, similarities between some CEE media systems and 
the Mediterranean media model were referred to as signs of a 
process of Italianization. In fact, this term was used because it 
seemed that the media systems in Eastern European new 
democracies would import/reproduce the Italian model 
(political parallelism, weak professionalization, overwhelming 
importance of television over newspapers).4 Two decades after 
the democratic breakthrough, the idea that other polarized 
pluralistic models could actually be interesting benchmarks 
for the analysis of the CEE media systems started to gain 
ground (p.232) amongst political communication scholars, 
especially due to the impact that features such as late 
democratization and strong TV market commercialization 
(which are dominant in most CEE countries but do not 
characterize Italy) might have had in the development of these 
media markets.
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The assumption that Iberian and CEE countries may have 
comparable media systems is strengthened by the similarities 
in these nations’ political past and present. It takes just a 
quick look at the political system correlates of the 
Mediterranean model to appreciate the similarities between 
CEE countries and Southern European new democracies such 
as Portugal, Spain, and even Greece. However, an analysis of 
specific media system characteristics offers a more complex 
picture. A series of case studies and essays published in 20105
and 20126 argue that the shift from a strictly defined 
communist model to post-communist models might have 
represented a mirroring of some European models or the 
creation of hybrids mixing the ideal-types proposed by Hallin 
and Mancini. In order to fully understand the path followed by 
each CEE media system, a relevant step is to test the most 
plausible hypothesis: mediterraneanization. Since this process 
does not necessarily mean a duplication of the Italian media 
system, other benchmarks are necessary.
The goal of this chapter is therefore to present Portugal and 
Spain as relevant benchmarks for the analysis of the 
relationship between media and politics in the CEE new 
democracies. Portugal and Spain are addressed separately, 
despite the fact that they are characterized as very similar 
systems within the polarized pluralistic model: in practice, an 
Iberian model. I argue that, despite sharing several features, 
these nations constitute different examples of the polarized 
pluralistic media system model. Unquestionably, these two 
neighbouring countries display several similarities, which are 
certainly due to the fact that they have followed the same 
pattern of political events over the last century: a short and 
turbulent experience of democratic republicanism, the 
implementation of authoritarian regimes that lasted several 
decades, an official absence from the Second World War, and 
a bloody war that caused the death of many and left deep 
scars in the society (the 1936–1939 Civil War in Spain, the 
1961–74 Colonial War in the so-called overseas provinces of 
Portugal). Both countries became democracies in the 
mid-1970s, achieved democratic consolidation in the 1980s, 
and became European Economic Community and Eurozone 
members at the same time. However, the economic power and 
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regional diversity of Spain vis-à-vis the weaker economic 
status of Portugal and its unity as nation state, as well as other 
factors that distinguish these nations, had an impact on the 
development of their media systems.
This chapter rests on a comparative framework describing the 
European Union member states in 2009.7 It offers a detailed 
analysis of the main features that characterize the Portuguese 
and Spanish media systems (with a particular (p.233) focus on 
the dimensions that either are directly linked to the realm of 
politics or that may have an impact on the role of the media in 
democratic societies), as well as some insights into how 
specific CEE media systems may resemble these countries. 
This comparative framework encompasses the dimensions 
suggested by Hallin and Mancini (market development, state 
intervention, journalistic professionalization, political 
parallelism)8 as well as other politically relevant dimensions 
that are related to these factors. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference between the original theoretical model and the 
approach taken here. In this chapter, I explore patterns of 
media political bias instead of political parallelism, since the 
former may be more suitable for a comparison between the 
two geographical extremes of the EU and more applicable to 
the CEE countries. This is because the concept of political 
parallelism rests on the existence of a relatively stable party 
system that the media outlets mirror more or less perfectly. 
This is the case in Portugal and Spain, but not in the CEE 
countries, where party system fluidity is a relevant pattern.9
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next four 
subsections, the Iberian countries are characterized in terms 
of press market development, state intervention in the media, 
political bias, and journalist professionalization. Within each 
subsection, an array of comparable data is used to place 
Portugal and Spain in the European landscape; then, the 
similarities and differences with CEE countries are discussed, 
and the relevance and impact of different levels of 
development, state intervention, political bias, and journalist 
professionalization are discussed. The concluding section of 
this chapter presents the main insights that the Portuguese 
and Spanish cases may offer to the students of CEE media 
systems.
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Figure 15.1. 11 Relative size of the press 
market: Average circulation of 
newspapers (in thousands) by a million 
people in Europe, 2009
Source: My own elaboration on the World 
Association of Newspapers 2010 
Yearbook data
The Portuguese and Spanish Media Systems in 
Comparative Perspective
Press Market Development
The Portuguese and Spanish media landscapes were described 
by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini as having a weak press 
market, with a small number of newspapers that were not 
consumed by the general public, but rather by a small elite. A 
predominance of TV exposure over newspaper readership was 
also a distinctive feature of the Iberian systems. The data 
collected by the World Association of Newspapers in 200910
confirms these trends. First, the average circulation of 
newspapers weighted by country population (a good proxy for 
market size) shows that both markets were focusing on a 
minority of citizens, even if the press market is relatively 
larger in Spain than in Portugal (Figure 15.1). However, the 
Iberian countries are not an exceptional case in the European 
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There are also differences between the Iberian countries in 
terms of the number of available titles. According to the World 
Association of Newspapers, in 2009 there were 155 daily 
newspapers in Spain, while in Portugal it was possible to find 
twenty-five different daily titles in the newstands. The Spanish 
market was therefore amongst the EU markets with higher 
press diversity (right after Germany); by contrast, Portugal 
was one of the twelve EU member states with the lowest 
number of daily newspapers. Given that this data does not 
distinguish between nation-wide and regional newspapers, the 
difference between the two Iberian countries is due to the 
cultural and regional diversity of Spain as opposed to the 
strongly unified and much smaller Portugal, where the 
regional media do not have the same strength or raison d’être.
Lastly, the predominance of TV over newspapers is still a 
reality. On average, a Spaniard spends fifteen minutes per day 
reading newspapers and almost four hours watching 
television.12 There is no similar data for the Portuguese habits 
of newspaper readership in 2009, but there are reasons to 
believe that they would be equally low. In 2009, the average 
Portuguese spent 3.5 hours of his/her day watching TV. Survey 
data shows that in Portugal virtually everybody watches TV, 
while just about two-thirds of the citizens under sixty-four and 
a (p.235) third of the citizens over sixty-five report newspaper 
reading habits. In the previous month, half of the interviewees 
had not read or even opened a daily newspaper.13
In sum, although it can be said that the Spanish and 
Portuguese markets are not among the strongest in Europe, 
the comparative advantage of Spain is undeniable, especially 
in terms of number of titles and relative size of the press 
market. If the Spanish press market is weak, the Portuguese 
press market is weaker than its neighbour’s. The World 
Association of Newspapers data shows that the media 
landscape in CEE countries is quite diversified, but on average 
the media markets are quite fragile too. For instance, the 
average number of daily newspapers in the CEE countries is 
thirty-seven titles, even if Bulgaria, Romania, and Czech 
Republic display more diversity in the newsstands than 
Slovakia or Slovenia. Moreover, the average size of the CEE 
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press markets is about 14 per cent of the total population, 
with Slovak and Romanian markets being smaller than those 
of Hungary and Bulgaria. The latter is also one of the few CEE 
countries where daily newspaper circulation increased 
between 2006 and 2011. The trend has been the opposite, 
especially in Poland, and can surely be connected to moderate 
to large cuts in the advertising expenditure in CEE media.14 In 
terms of TV predominance, the similarities between Eastern 
and Iberian countries are evident: in the CEE countries, the 
average amount of time watching TV is considerably high (3h 
40m), with Romanian and Polish citizens dedicating more than 
four hours to television watching.15
What are the implications of this? A small, fragile press 
market may lead to a weakened role of newspapers as a means 
of vertical communication between the political elites and the 
citizens, leading them to operate more as a horizontal 
communication device between the political world and the 
other elites.16 A recent survey found that about half of 
Portuguese citizens believe that drawing the attention of the 
media to a specific subject is an effective form of political 
participation.17 However, it is reasonable to assume that most 
citizens were thinking about the role and power of the 
television instead of the press, considering the relevance that 
television has in the Portuguese media landscape and the low 
levels of newspaper circulation. Also, although TV is seen as a 
means of vertical communication, this communication is often 
done in a sensationalistic fashion (through the use of human 
interest and dramatic frames), which often contributes to the 
erosion of trust in the political realm.
It can also be argued that a small market also poses financial 
challenges to the long-term survival of newspapers, and 
weakens their capacity to resist political and economic 
pressures by eroding their autonomy. In 2009, the relationship 
between the size of the press market and an index of 
journalistic professionalization in Europe (see ‘Journalist 
Professionalization’) was very strong,18 which suggests that 
journalists are more autonomous and devoted to the public 
service ideal in wider markets. Accordingly, political19 and
(p.236) economic20 threats to press freedom (as measured by 
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Freedom House)21 are stronger in smaller press markets.22
In Portugal and Spain, the economic threats to press freedom 
were negligible in 2009, especially in comparison to Italy and 
most CEE countries, but political threats are a problem in 
Spain, as we will see in more detail bellow. Nevertheless, 
economic threats to newspaper survival are significant: for 
instance, in the last ten years, two mainstays of the 
Portuguese press (the right-wing Independente and the tabloid
24 Horas) disappeared, while other important titles, such as
Público, carried out a substantial reduction of their journalistic 
staff and struggle for survival.
State Intervention: Ownership, Funding, Regulation
The most relevant Portuguese broadcasting companies are the 
state-owned RTP (1956/1957), with two open-signal channels 
(RTP1 and RTP2), and the commercial broadcasters SIC (1992) 
and TVI (1993). In Spain, TVE (1956) also has two channels, 
while Mediaset España controls Cuatro (2005) and Telecinco
(1989). Atresmedia Televisión, which owns Antena 3 (1990) 
and LaSexta (2006), is also a relevant competitor in the 
Spanish market. In Portugal, RTP lost the battle for audiences 
in the mid-1990s, mostly due to the competitive, fresh, and 
modern style adopted by SIC and, later, by TVI. In 2009, the 
two public channels reached less than 30 per cent of audience 
share, while the two private broadcasters were able to attract 
more than half of the TV-watching citizens. In Spain, the 
outlook is similar (Table 15.1), even though the two TVE 
channels had to compete with a wider set of private 
broadcasters.
The advent of commercial TV happened more or less at the 
same time in the Iberian Peninsula and CEE countries (i.e., 
around 1990). While in most CEE countries the first private 
broadcasters started to operate right after the fall of the 
communist regimes, in Portugal and Spain the liberalization of 
the television sector (as well as the privatization of some 
newspapers) only happened fifteen years after the democratic 
breakthrough. In line with what happens in most CEE (Poland 
excluded) and Southern European countries (Italy excluded), 
the Portuguese and Spanish television markets are strongly 
dominated by commercial broadcasters. However, there are 
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differences in terms of the degree of commercialization. In 
Portugal and Spain, as well as in the Czech Republic or 
Estonia, private channels have about two times the audience 
share of the public broadcasters. In Romania and Bulgaria, 
commercialization has been more intense, with the state-
owned TV getting six to nine times less audience share than 
the commercial channels (Table 15.1).
The Spanish and Portuguese television markets are therefore 
clearly dominated by commercial broadcasters. The relative 
weakness of the state-owned TV channels is a problem, mainly 
because public broadcasters tend to (and should) convey high-
quality information to their audiences to a greater extent
(p.237)
Table 15.1. Relative audience shares of free 
access national public and private channels in 
Europe, 2009
Public channels Private channels Diff.
Bulgaria 12.8 74 –61.2
Romania 7.1 66.4 –59.3
Greece 16.6 69.4 –52.8
Lithuania 13.7 58.5 –44.8
Hungary 13.6 56.8 –43.2
Slovakia 19.7 55.9 –36.2
Latvia 14.6 48.2 –33.6
Spain 22.6 55.7 –33.1
Cyprus 21.7 52.7 –31
Czech Republic 28.1 56.1 –28
Portugal 29.8 52.1 –22.3
Estonia 16.8 37.9 –21.1
France 34.4 53.1 –18.7
Slovenia 29.8 44.4 –14.6
Germany 43.1 52.5 –9.4
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Public channels Private channels Diff.
Poland 41.6 45.6 –4
UK 36.4 40 –3.6
Finland 43.8 45.3 –1.5




Sweden 32.9 30.1 2.8




Netherlands 35.7 21.1 14.6
Austria 40.1 20.4 19.7
Ireland 37 13.6 23.4
Denmark 66.5 1.8 64.7
Source: My own elaboration on the European Audiovisual 
Observatory 2010 Yearbook data.
than commercial TV channels, thereby providing a public service to 
the citizenry. In the Iberian Peninsula, airtime dedicated to news 
and information is indeed higher in public than in private channels. 
In the case of Portugal, in 2007 there was an average of 6 per cent 
of airtime dedicated to news in commercial channels and 18 per 
cent in public channels. In Spain, the figures are 16 per cent for 
private broadcasters and 26 per cent for the public broadcasting 
service.23 However, despite the fact that the Portuguese public 
channels broadcast more news, experts believe that RTP does not 
offer more political news, a wider range of programming, or more 
in-depth, accurate, and trustworthy information than the 
commercial broadcasters.24 In Spain, commercial channels do offer 
less quality information than the TVE channels.25 Consequently, the 
strong commercialization of the TV market looks more hazardous in 
Spain than in Portugal.
The degree to which a public broadcaster offers more news 
and high-quality information to their audience may depend on 
how dependent it is on (p.238) advertisement revenues. In 
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other words, a public channel that receives a substantial 
proportion of its money from the state may feel less inclined to 
turn to infotainment and cut the airtime devoted to hard news, 
since its survival depends less on audience shares than on the 
quality of the public service provided. However, there are no 
significant differences between these two countries: the 
Portuguese RTP gets 77 per cent of its revenues from the 
state, while TVE needs advertisement to provide for a third of 
its expenses.26 The fact that the public broadcasters get 
considerable amounts of funding from the state may result in a 
weaker tendency to produce low-quality content, but the deep 
economic crisis in the Iberian Peninsula menaces this model of 
public TV funding. The public broadcasters in Spain and 
Portugal are under serious threat, especially after the Greek 
public broadcasting service shutdown in July 2013. For 
instance, following government directions, the current RTP 
administration is implementing a series of measures aimed at 
restructuring the public broadcasting system and substantially 
cutting its costs, namely by means of staff reduction. 
Interestingly enough, except for Poland, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia, the CEE public broadcasters get more than four-
fifths of their funds from the State.27 As we have seen above, 
most of these broadcasters register considerably lower levels 
of audience share, which means that their capability to attract 
advertisement funds is weak and their sole survival is 
dependent on the will of the political actors.
A third form of state intervention concerns regulation. In order 
to grasp this aspect of European media systems, I use the 
Freedom House index of legal threats to press freedom, which 
is based on an examination of the laws and regulations that 
may influence media content and the government’s inclination 
to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media’s 
ability to operate.28 Legal constraints are rather weak in 
Portugal and Spain, as well as in some CEE countries (Czech 
Republic, Baltic countries), especially in comparison to Italy, 
Romania, or Bulgaria. Indeed, the term ‘savage deregulation’ 
was once used to describe the process that opened the door to 
private broadcasters in Portugal.29 One could actually argue 
that in 2009 there were three clusters in Central and Eastern 
Europe: countries where media legislation poses a serious 
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threat to press freedom (Romania, Bulgaria), which are closer 
to the status quo in Italy; those where legal menaces to 
freedom are not an issue (Czech Republic, Baltic countries), 
thus being similar to the Iberian nations; and those that are 
placed between these two clusters (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia).30
Political Bias
Along with a weak press market and a commercialized TV 
context, the Portuguese media system is characterized by the 
concentration of multiple forms of (p.239) media into single 
organizations. Impresa controls one generalist open-signal 
channel (SIC), several cable channels, one weekly newspaper 
(Expresso) and one news magazine (Visão). Media Capital
controls open-signal (TVI) and cable channels, an internet 
portal, and radio stations. Diário de Notícias and Jornal de 
Notícias, which were state-controlled from the mid-1970s to 
the late 1980s, now belong to the owner of the news radio 
station TSF, Controlinveste (renamed Global Media Group in 
December 2014). Público is owned by Sonaecom, the media 
and communication branch of one of the largest Portuguese 
private companies, SONAE. The state owns two generalist 
open-signal channels (RTP1 and RTP2), a few cable and 
regional channels, the public radio station RDP, and the news 
agency Lusa. Lastly, the tabloid Correio da Manhã is owned by
Cofina, which also controls the business newspaper Jornal de 
Negócios, the news magazine Sábado, two free newspapers 
(Metro and Destak), and the cable channel CM TV.
In Spain, the media environment is not very different, since 
patterns of cross-media concentration can also be found. For 
instance, Prisa controls not only the newspaper El País, but 
also owns several radio stations and about a fifth of the
Mediaset España shares (Telecinco, Cuatro, other TV 
channels).31 Also, most media outlets in Spain belong to just a 
few owners. In 2009, five companies controlled more than two-
thirds of the total newspaper circulation in Spain (Prisa, 
Vocento, Unidad Editoral, Prensa Iberica, and Grupo Zeta), 
and the television market was also very concentrated in the 
hands of a few different operators,32 some of which have 
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interests in the Portuguese audiovisual market. In fact, TVI, 
founded by entities linked to the Catholic Church in 1993, was 
bought by Prisa in the 2000s.
Media concentration is often seen as a threat to the plurality 
of viewpoints or, in other terms, to external diversity. External 
diversity ‘is constituted by a plurality of media actors, each of 
them representing a particular part of the entire spectrum of 
political opinions.’33 Even if individual media actors are 
systematically imbalanced in favour of a specific political 
ideology or party, diversity emerges from the presence and 
interaction of these actors at the national level. Yet 
concentration only has an impact in terms of external diversity 
if ownership threatens neutrality or internal diversity,34 and 
that is not always the case. For instance, in Italy the 
newspapers and TV channels owned by the Berlusconi family 
display a right-wing bias. However, in Portugal, the private 
broadcaster SIC and the weekly newspaper Expresso, which 
were created by Pinto Balsemão (prime minister between 1981 
and 1983 and one of the founders of the centre-right party
Partido Social Democrata), are not strongly biased in favour of 
this party, especially in comparison with the degree of bias in
El País caused by the informal proximity between its owners 
and PSOE.35
In Portugal, media political bias lost relevance after the 
normalization of the democratic regime. Levels of polarization 
in the party system are now lower (p.240) than in the 1980s,36
and the trend is downward;37 moreover, levels of party 
membership are low and declining in Portugal. Therefore, in 
commercial terms, it makes more sense for the media outlets 
to adopt a catch-all (or internally diverse) perspective on 
politics, reproducing the catch-all nature of the most 
important parties in the Portuguese landscape: PS and PSD.38
In other words, political conflict does not sell. In the eyes of 
experts in media and politics, the most important daily 
newspapers in Portugal are not particularly biased. Among the 
subset of outlets that display a moderate level of partisanship 
(Expresso and the four TV channels), there was some degree 
of bipartisan balance in 2009 (i.e. a clear division of the biased 
outlets between PSD and PS).39 This is arguably not a sign of 
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political parallelism, both because the levels of bias are low 
and because the public channels are the most biased, its 
political leaning depending on which party is the incumbent. 
Survey data seems to confirm these trends: 40 to 50 per cent 
of Portuguese do not have an opinion on media plurality, 
which may be understood as the absence of blatant political 
leanings. Moreover, those who had an opinion considered 
private broadcasters to be less biased than the public 
broadcaster.40
In Spain, political bias is believed to be fairly strong, and the 
levels of press-party parallelism were so significant that the 
expression Parlamento de Papel (Parliament of Paper) was 
used in reference to the Spanish newspaper market.41 Spanish 
newspapers cater to particular political audiences. Several 
considerations are important concerning specific outlets. First, 
while about a third of the Portuguese experts were unable to 
express an opinion about media–party relationships, this task 
seems to have been much easier for the Spanish experts. 
Second, the most relevant Spanish newspapers and private 
broadcasters display a moderate to high level of political bias. 
Third, while in the case of Portugal the public broadcaster was 
considered to be the most biased outlet due to its incumbent 
party liaisons, in Spain the most relevant newspapers and 
commercial channels are the outlets with the strongest levels 
of political bias.42
Levels of political partiality of the most important outlets in 
the CEE countries vary considerably, with the Baltic countries 
displaying low to moderate levels of media partisanship, the 
public broadcasters in Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia being 
more biased than the commercial television, and the degree of 
internal diversity or neutrality in Hungarian and Romanian 
outlets varying considerably, independently of their nature 
(printed vs audiovisual) or ownership (public vs private).43
Slovakia and Portugal share a relevant feature: a trend 
towards stronger levels of political bias in the public channels 
vis-à-vis their private counterparts, even if this trend is much 
stronger in the former than in the latter. Interestingly enough, 
in CEE countries, levels of political bias are believed to be 
stronger within locally owned mass media, which are not only 
the object, but also the subject of political instrumentalization 
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and corruption.44 One of the key features of specific CEE 
media systems, such as (p.241) those of Bulgaria or Romania, 
where ownership results in distorted media markets, is the 
fact that media are owned and run for reasons other than 
profit or public service, a pattern that has been associated 
with the departure of foreign investors (along with the 
professional standards that they defended) and the rise of 
local moguls who instrumentalize their media outlets.45
Journalist Professionalization
This dimension refers to the degree to which journalists 
acknowledge and comply with norms of ethics and quality in 
their work. Journalist professionalization matters because it 
leads, at least theoretically, to higher standards of information 
quality, hence benefiting citizens who need political 
information in order to make their decisions. Levels of 
journalist professionalization46 vary considerably in Europe. 
On an eleven-point scale, the average level of journalist 
professionalization according to experts is 4.9, meaning that 
overall levels of journalism professionalization in Europe are 
not particularly high. Nevertheless, there is a substantial 
difference between the situation in the EU Scandinavian 
countries (where the levels of professionalization are very 
high) and the patterns observed for Italy and several CEE 
nations (where the experts were pessimistic about the 
condition of journalism as a profession). Also, journalist 
professionalization seems to be stronger in Portugal than in 
Spain (Figure 15.2).
However, the relative superiority of Portugal vis-à-vis Spain 
and other countries does not mitigate the fact that, on 
average, the Portuguese journalists are poorly 
professionalized. A study of journalists in Portugal points out 
several potential causes for this state of affairs, some of them 
related to the size of the market and the precarious situation 
of younger workers.47 This is actually a common feature of the 
Iberian countries. For instance, a few years ago, there were 
about 32,000 students of journalism in Spain.48 In an 
underdeveloped press market, this means that the demand for 
this kind of profession is much lower than the supply, and that 
those who need to work are more willing to accept precarious 
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Figure 15.2.  Journalist 
professionalization in Europe, 2009
Source: My own elaboration on the 
European Media Systems Survey 
dataset50
and/or degrading conditions. The Portuguese market is also 
believed to have been flooded with young educated journalist 
aspirants in the past decades.49
Journalist professionalization in CEE countries is generally 
very low, but it is actually possible to identify three patterns: 
countries where professionalization is indeed very weak 
(Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary), nations with low to moderate 
levels of professionalization (Czech Republic, Poland, 
Lithuania), and countries displaying a moderate degree of 
professionalization (Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia) 
(Figure 15.2). The low patterns of journalistic autonomy and 
professionalization in CEE countries are linked to the levels of 
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or Estonia51









journalist professionalization is strongly and negatively 
associated with legal, political, and economic threats to press 
freedom.52 As we have seen above, in 2009 political threats to 
press freedom were not a fundamental problem in Portugal, 
but in Spain the political constraints on the work of journalists 
were particularly strong. In the EU26 group, there were only 
two other countries where press freedom was being equally or 
more threatened by political actors than in Spain: Greece and 
Romania. In 2006, the Madrid Association of the Press
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approved a declaration stating that Spanish journalists were 
facing a series of problems endangering press freedom and 
degrading journalists as professionals. Media editors were 
accused of using the media for propaganda purposes serving 
powerful people or political parties, and licences were 
arguably being granted with criteria of ideological affinity or 
special interests. Press freedom, despite being guaranteed by 
the Constitution, is not always accepted by public authorities, 
especially when terrorism or the Spanish royal family are 
involved.53
In terms of public service and the media as watchdog
paradigm, journalists from both sides of the frontier face 
challenges and, to some extent, a degradation of their role. 
The resilience of the Portuguese former Prime Minister José 
Sócrates, namely his capacity to stay in office despite the 
highly mediatized scandals in the mid-2000s, is a good 
example of how the historical moment in (p.243) which 
ministers could be fired by the press54 has passed. In addition, 
there has been a debate about whether Manuela Moura 
Guedes, a newscast anchor known for her anti-government 
positions, had to resign from Prisa’s TVI due to the close 
relationship between the Portuguese and the Spanish socialist 
prime ministers.
In Portugal, survey data shows that the media is not seen by 
the public as an agent of change, but as a privileged actor that 
can retrieve information about the backstage of the political 
world and offer it to the citizens and democratic institutions 
that have the means to act. In 2011, more than two-thirds of 
the citizens considered that allowing the media greater access 
to the reasons and criteria surrounding the government 
decision-making process is an effective form of vertical 
accountability (i.e. a way by which the citizens can actually 
monitor their elected representatives), even if only a handful 
actually believed that the media are able to stop abuses from 
the government.55 Conversely, in Spain, the media capacity to 
control abusive practices by the government is believed to be 
much stronger: on a scale from 1 to 5, the media get 3.5, the 
same score granted to the Constitutional Court.56
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was not to make an in-depth, 
comprehensive comparative analysis of the media systems in 
the Iberian Peninsula and Central and Eastern Europe, but 
rather to propose an operational comparative framework and 
to use it in order to describe relevant patterns and trends in 
the Iberian markets, offering the Portuguese and Spanish 
cases as benchmarks for the analysis of CEE media systems. 
The chapter tries therefore to set the ground for comparative 
studies of media systems from the geographical extremes of 
the European Union, by identifying interesting patterns to be 
explored by subsequent research.
One of the most interesting general conclusions to be drawn 
from this chapter is that being part of a geographical entity 
and sharing several historical, political, economic, and cultural 
features may not result in similar media systems being 
implemented. In fact, the Portuguese and Spanish media 
systems are more different that one would expect. Despite 
being strongly influenced by it, the development of the media 
markets is not completely dependent on historical and political 
legacies, but can be shaped by the actors that interact with 
the media system or work within its frontiers. For the students 
of CEE media systems, the idea that the historical political 
background is but one factor within the array of dimensions 
shaping media system developments may encourage them to 
focus even more on the identification of critical junctures 
taking place in those countries after 1989.
(p.244) Several other patterns are worth underlining. First, 
low levels of press market development do not always result in 
threats to media freedom due to a weaker resilience to 
pressures from political or economic actors. In the case of 
Portugal, political and economic threats to press freedom are 
rather low despite the underdevelopment of its press market. 
Journalist professionalization and low levels of party 
polarization may be an asset here. Second, commercialization 
does result in weaker levels of news and quality information 
being offered to the audience. This is especially worrying in 
new democracies where the televised media is probably the 
most important, if not the only, source of political information 
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for a considerable amount of the population. Third, private 
ownership does not always mean higher levels of political bias, 
and state ownership does not always mean lower levels of 
bias. In the case of Portugal, political conflict does not sell and 
seems not to lead to indirect benefits to journalists, editors 
and owners of private broadcasters, since the levels of 
political bias are moderate. Fourth, the reasons why Poland 
managed to create a dual model (as in Italy), whereas 
commercialization followed a monopolistic pattern in Romania 
and Bulgaria but not in several other CEE countries, may 
benefit from the comparison with the Iberian countries’ 
process of TV market liberalization and patterns of 
competition for audiences and advertisement revenues.
Lastly, an interesting pattern emerges from this preliminary 
comparative analysis. Quite often, the media systems in 
Slovakia, Slovenia, or Czech Republic present features that 
come close to the Iberian models. Would it be therefore 
possible to speak of a process of Iberianization of these media 
systems? If that is the case, the examination of the degree, 
causes, and historical path that resulted in this state of affairs 
may constitute an interesting research agenda for students of 
comparative political communication in Europe.
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